Hostilities have but to commence and a rash of
strategists erupts: indeed, it seems that everyone, except the ones
actually running it, knows how to run the war. Just as suddenly,
intelligence agencies start planting stories: every agency, it
seems, knew what was going to happen, every agency sent warnings,
but every other agency scuppered its reports; every paper, every
commentator suddenly seems to know what which top-secret agency has
told Government.
While these two rules apply universally, one
applies specially to democracies like ours. In the first week, the
nationalist response is so strong that even the opposition feels it
prudent to endorse what is being done. Just a while later, sensing
that the sky has cleared, opposition parties revert to extracting
political mileage. In this age -- of momentary attention spans, of
mental rhythms set by fleeting electronic images - the patriotic
interval lasts less than a week. And once that week of mandatory
abstinence is over, once again every half-truth, every concoction is
good enough by which to traduce others.
"Kargil shows that the Lahore bus ride was a flop,"
the opposition charges, and adds the sound-bite for TV cameras, "The
Prime Minister went on a ride, in fact he was taken for a ride."
"The brazenness with which Pakistan has sent even regulars from its
Army shows that the much-touted Lahore Declaration was not worth the
paper it was written on," it pronounces.
The function such declarations serve is that they
become the standard by which the conduct of the signatories is
judged. That Pakistan just the other day had signed agreements with
India, and that in plain violation of them it has sent its men and
materials to occupy our territory has been of decisive significance
in putting it in the dock. On the other side, that the Indian Prime
Minister went so far is taken as testimony of India's earnest desire
to ensure harmonious relations, to set aside the history of mutual
bitterness. Together the two elements are among the major factors
which have persuaded governments the world over -- including
governments which have been not just the supporters but the props of
Pakistan -- that the responsibility for the current situation rests
squarely with Pakistan. But here, "Vajpayee was taken for a
ride."
Look at it the other way. The Simla Agreement has
been violated by Pakistan throughout these years, and that on the
testimony of successive Congress governments too. Does that mean
that in signing it Indira Gandhi and the rest were taken for a ride?
Just recall the clauses, and contrast them with what Pakistan has
been doing all these years -- during most of which Congress
governments were in office here.
Article 1, Clause 2: that the two
countries shall settle their differences through bilateral
negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon
between them -- for 25 years Pakistan has been screeching about
Kashmir at every international gathering. Clause 2 again:
that neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation, and that
both sides shall prevent the organization, assistance or
encouragement of any act detrimental to peaceful and harmonious
relations between the two countries -- Pakistan has spared no effort
to break India through insurgency, terrorism, secession. Clause
3: that both countries shall respect each other's territorial
integrity and sovereignty, that they shall not interfere in each
other's internal affairs. Clause 5: that the two shall
respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity etc.
Clause 6: that the two shall refrain from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity etc. of each other.
Article 4: that in Jammu and Kashmir the
Line of Control resulting from the cease fire of December 17, 1971
shall be respected by both sides..., that neither side shall seek to
alter it unilaterally..., that both sides shall refrain from the
threat or use of force in violation of this Line.
Now, in every particular instance, what Pakistan
has been doing since 1971 has been in complete contravention of its
provisions. Even this current incursion into Kargil is an eightfold
violation of the Simla Agreement. Yet, Congressmen hold up the
signing of that Agreement as the highpoint of statesmanship, and the
signing of the Lahore Declaration as that of self-deception!
"But after 1971 we never lowered our guard," said
one of these voluble Congress-spokesmen the other day during a TV
discussion. Is it because you were always alert that Pakistan was
able to organise such a lethal insurrection in Punjab -- one that
cost the country 21,000 lives? Is it because your guard was always
up that Pakistan was able to almost wrench Kashmir from the country
during 1990 and 1996 -- an episode that cost the country another
15,000 lives?
Indeed, even in regard to Kargil specifically,
several limbs of the problem are directly traceable to the
shortsighted decisions of the leaders the Congress makes such a show
of revering. The launching base of this incursion has been Skardu.
But our forces had taken Skardu in 1948. They were asked to
withdraw, and the place was left for Pakistan to reoccupy. The very
points from which Kargil is shelled these days had been taken by our
forces in 1965, and again in 1971. As had Haji Pir Pass. On both
occasions they were asked to withdraw, and these salients were
handed back to Pakistan. Our soldiers pay the price to this day. But
"We never let our guard down," the spokesmen go on claiming. And TV
channels continue to broadcast the claim, newspapers continue to
reproduce it.
"Even now the Government has not realised the
gravity of the incursion," said the other participant. Is there
anything on the ground -- in the theatre of fighting -- which gives
substance to such a claim? On the contrary, there has not been one
single occasion during the last fifty years when an incursion has
been met with such a massive response: the number of men who have
been marshalled, the calibre of weaponry which has been deployed,
the airpower which has been sent in -- the scale of the reaction has
certainly registered on Pakistan. But here the charge, "Even now the
Government has not realised the gravity of..." TV channels broadcast
such nonsense, papers reproduce it -- without asking even an
elementary question.
"But why did Fernandes promise safe-passage? Our
soldiers are being killed, and he is promising safe-passage to the
killers!", the spokesmen exclaim, their voices rising to project
patriotism.
There certainly has been one good result of this
incursion: it has made Congressmen and Communists talk the
nationalist's language! Till the other day, they were denouncing as
a chauvinist, a xenophobe, a revanchist, anyone who used words they
are using today. There is calculation in this, of course. The
question of Sonia's nationality having become an issue one way or
another; the current incursion, the discoveries of explosives in
various cities, having led people to wonder once again whether, in
such a situation, it would be prudent to hand the country over to a
person about whom they know nothing -- events and issues having
taken such a turn, the Congress sees that it would be fatal not to
be seen as super-nationalists. There is the positive advice too of
the PR men: nationalism and security have been the USPs of the BJP,
snatch these.
But even when the nationalist rhetoric is triggered
by such calculation, I see progress. After all, what is it that the
Congress and its PR experts think will win people over? Nationalism!
Till the other day, the calculus was that it is by denouncing
nationalism as jingoism that votes will be garnered! Mysterious are
the ways of the Almighty!
Will people not see through the pretense? Will
people not see that these parties are trying to put even aggression
on our country to political use?
These narrowly-focused politicians apart, the media
must see the way it is being used by them, and what the effect of
that is on the ability of the country to handle even grave
emergencies.
The week of patriotism over, and the need for
diverting attention from its fabricated mourning around Janpath
becoming urgent, the Congress reverted to its threefold strategy.
Hurl the unspecified, but always sweeping insinuation, and insist
that it is for the other fellow to disprove it, not for you to prove
it: Mohan Guruswamy, Bhagwat, the "utter failure in handling
Kargil". Second, what used to be the favourite device of our
"liberals", target one man: in their case, you will recall, it used
to be, "Just remove Rebeiro, the common Sikh has developed so much
hatred for him personally"; then it became, "Just remove KPS Gill,
and the common Sikh will come rushing back"; in Kashmir, "Just
remove Jagmohan"; Fernandes has been the target-of-choice this time
round. Third, reinforce the impression that this Government is in
disarray, that even in the face of such a grave challenge it is not
able to make up its mind: so, plant stories one day that Fernandes
has been ticked-off by Brijesh Mishra, the next day that Advani has
been sidelined on Kargil, the day after that rival media-cells have
been set up by Vajpayee and Advani!
To see how the media is yoked to, and makes itself
available for doing someone else's work, recall the stories about
"safe-passage" to the invaders. They conveyed the impression that
this was an offer from George Fernandes. But how did the story
originate?
Fernandes had called some journalists for an
informal briefing. A journalist asked him whether Government would
consider some proposal to give the Pakistanis "safe-passage". If a
proposal to that effect comes, Fernandes said, Government could
consider it.
Now, there was no proposal. What the result of
considering a proposal will be -- of considering any proposal --
will surely depend on the circumstances that prevail at the time the
proposal arrives: in Hazratbal, in Charar-e-Sharif the Government --
having treated terrorists to embarrassing hospitality -- in fact
accorded them safe-passage; in the case of the Hazratbal siege it
did more, it provided superior-class transportation to them up to
the Pakistan border. In one situation, the loss of its men, the
barbarity of the invaders may convince a government that not one of
the enemy should be allowed to return alive. In another situation,
the professional assessment may be that, while the enemy's men can
all be taken out one by one, doing so will result in very heavy
casualties to one's own side, and therefore, a government may decide
to accord them a way out. In Hazratbal, the Government decided that
the terrorists could certainly be taken out; that even the
casualties might be minimal; but that the mosque was liable to be
damaged, and that would give Pakistan an opportunity to galvanize
the Islamic world against India. So, what the ultimate decision,
after weighing a proposal, will be, is certainly not settled when
one says that, if a proposal comes, it could be considered.
That is obvious. Yet, the story was put out as if
Fernandes had made this as a definite offer. Denunciations followed
denunciations. The impression which had been conveyed by the
original twist was thereby reinforced. The work was done.
The twist apart, lobbing a hypothetical question is
by itself sufficient to work the mischief. For instance, supposing a
correspondent asks Fernandes, "The Pakistan Foreign Secretary says
that they can use any weapon. They have nuclear weapons. If they
throw a nuclear bomb on Mumbai, what will be the Government's
response?"
If Fernandes says, "No one should fool himself, we
will retaliate in kind," the next day's headline will be, "We will
use atom bomb: Fernandes." Peacenik turns war-monger, the
"news-analysts" will observe. "Height of irresponsibility," the
editorials will pronounce. If, on the other hand, he says, "We are
not mad, we will not kill millions just to keep up with the madness
of others," the next day's headings will run, "Peacenik Fernandes
bangs door on option," the "news-analysts" will recount his having
been associated with peace-movements in the past, his "links" with
socialist and disarmament circles in Europe, editorials will
pontificate how criminally irresponsible it is for the Defence
Minister of the country to foreclose a strategic option, and how
this will be music to the ears of Pakistani strategists. If
Fernandes says, "That is sheer speculation, it is just not possible
that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons for such a strictly local
engagement," the headings will be, "Ostrich Fernandes, reality will
disappear if I don't see it,"....
And it is enough to get one person, any person in
authority to answer a hypothetical question, it is enough to get
that one person to do so just once. That one answer broadcast, all
you have to do is to ask him the same question again. If he repeats
his earlier answer, you have renewed grounds for your earlier
lampooning of him. If he reverses it, "Fernandes somersaults on
free-passage." If he strains to correct what you had put out,
"Fernandes tries to wriggle out."
You can ensure the same effect by asking the same
question to some other person in authority. The Prime Minister and
Fernandes are standing next to each other after the launching of INS
Mysore. Ask the Prime Minister, "Your Defence Minister has offered
safe-passage to the intruders. What is your view on the proposal?"
If the Prime Minister repeats what Fernandes had said, the earlier
outrage can now be directed at him. If he does not, "PM-Defence
Minister at loggerheads on safe-passage"...
The lesson for ministers is obvious. In the Kargil
case, for instance, the policy has been simple, it is a one-line
policy: the place will be cleared of every intruder. Operational
details on the day's developments are being provided by defence and
civilian officials. It is only when there is a development in regard
to that single-point policy that a minister need meet the media, and
then only through a formal press conference -- a conference to be
limited to that new development alone.
But there is also a lesson for the media. We also
owe some responsibility. Assume for a moment that all the fault for
the recent "controversies" lay with Fernandes. Should we in the
media not pay at least some heed to the situation in which the
country is? Even in normal times, but specially in times such as
these, if we spot a moth on a friend's nose, should we wield an axe
to remove it?
Perhaps an example will bring home the point
better. There is as much distance between the justification for the
NATO strikes in Kosovo and our action in Kargil as between the
heavens and earth. There is so much more on which NATO officials can
be pulled up, on which they can be ridiculed in regard to the
airstrikes on Yugoslavia.
But in all those press-briefings -- available for
all our journalists live on TV -- have you ever seen a European or
American journalist heckle or even interrupt the NATO spokesman the
way we have come to think is our right to do here? Have you ever
seen anyone of them treat those spokesmen as if they were the enemy
whom the journalists have to trap, and make a fool of?
The advent of TV has enlarged the reach of the media. And thereby
its capacity to harm. It really is essential that our journalists
consider the effect of what they are doing. And that they be wary of
how others - within and outside the country -- are using them, for
purposes that are far removed from the interests of the
country.